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ABSTRACT 
After long discussions about the introduction of corporate criminal liability, the German 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection presented a first draft bill for a new 
Corporate Sanctions Act in August 2019. The act introduces a major shift in German 
Criminal law by proposing severe sanctions on companies for corporate criminal offenses. It 
includes regulations on internal investigations, compliance management systems and legal 
privilege. Since it was published, the act is discussed intensely among legal experts, politi-
cians and the public. The following article presents the most important provisions of the 
draft bill. In addition, the authors compare the act to further jurisdiction’s legislation, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 22, 2019, the German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz) presented a first draft bill on 
a Corporate Sanctions Act. The draft introduces severe sanctions on companies for cor-
porate criminal offenses and includes regulations on internal investigations, compliance 
management systems and legal privilege. 
 
The draft also introduces a major shift in German criminal law. Under existing German 
law, companies cannot be held criminally responsible. The German Act on Regulatory 
Offenses (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz - OWiG) permits corporate fines for offenses com-
mitted by certain personnel in managerial positions pursuant to § 30 OWiG1 or by other 
employees if the person responsible for ensuring fulfilment of supervisory duties incum-
bent on the company itself violates these duties (§ 130 OWiG)2. Although being part of 
the regulatory law which historically was designed for minor offenses beyond the radar of 
criminal law, there could be severe sanctions imposed on companies and individuals - even 
under current law. The amount of the fine may be up to EUR 10 million. In special cases 
the amount may be significantly higher, e.g. § 56 of the German Banking Act (KWG): the 
higher of 20 million Euros or 10 percent of the total turnover achieved by the legal entity 
or association in the financial year preceding the decision of the authorities. In addition, 
there is the possibility of skimming off the profit achieved in full (confiscation). 
 
However, the prosecution practice in Germany has been inconsistent due to the unregu-
lated discretion of public prosecutors, with major regional differences in the number of 
investigations initiated by public prosecutors as well as in the amounts of fines imposed.3 
Moreover, the German system does not have anything comparable to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines (USSG), which seek to impose similar sanctions for similar conduct. 
 
After long discussions4 about the introduction of corporate criminal liability, the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection presented a draft bill for a new 
	
		
1  For an overview on § 30 OWiG see Charlotte Schmitt-Leonardy, in: Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, § 30, mar-
ginal no. 1 et seqq. (Heribert Blum et al eds., 1st ed., 2016). 
2  For an overview on § 130 OWiG see Susanne Beck, in: Beck’scher Onlinekommentar Ordnungswidrigkei-
tengesetz, § 130, marginal no. 1 et seqq. (Jürgen Graf, 23rd edition 2019). 
3  Elisa Hoven & Thomas Weigend, Der Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandssanktionengesetzes, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 30, 31 (2018); Thomas Kutschaty, Deutschland braucht ein Unternehmensstrafrecht, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 74, 74 et seq. (2013). 
4  Cf. Carsten Beisheim & Laura Jung, Unternehmensstrafrecht: Der neue Kölner Entwurf eines Verbands-
sanktionengesetzes (VerbSG-E), CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 63 (2018); Alexander Baur, 
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Corporate Sanctions Act. This draft is not yet final and may be modified in the legislative 
process. However, it portends significant change in Germany, and we describe below the 
most important provisions of the draft bill as well as their potential impact on companies.5 
II. OVERVIEW ON MAIN REGULATIONS 
 
A. Duty to Investigate Corporate Criminal Offenses 
 
Under the existing Act on Regulatory Offenses, it is at the public prosecution’s discretion 
to initiate preliminary proceedings against companies (facultative prosecution). This is 
the main reason for the existing inconsistent investigation practice described above. The 
new draft bill plans to introduce the so-called principle of legality (mandatory prosecu-
tion), meaning that public prosecutors will be obliged to investigate possible corporate 
criminal offenses under the new Corporate Sanctions Act. A corporate criminal offense 
under the drafted Corporate Sanctions Act would be a criminal offense by which the com-
pany’s duties are breached or by which the company was or was intended to be enriched 
(§ 2 (1) draft bill). 
 
B. Monetary Sanctions up to 10 percent of Revenue 
 
The existing German Act on Regulatory Offenses provides for an absolute upper limit of 
EUR 10 million per offense regarding administrative fines on companies, though it does 
permit confiscating illegal gains, which sometimes resulted in a greater sanction.6 Pursu-
ant to § 9 (2) of the new draft bill, this upper limit for fines would be raised significantly, 
up to 10 percent of the company’s average revenue over the last three years (if it exceeds 
EUR 100 million). The relevant revenue would be comprised of the world-wide revenue 
made by all companies or individuals operating within the same business unit. If the av-
erage revenue was be-low EUR 100 million, the absolute upper limit would remain at 





Mück, Praxiskommentar zum Kölner Entwurf eines Verbandsanktionengesetzes – VerbSG-E, NEUE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR INSOLVENZ- UND SANIERUNGSRECHT, 311 (2018); Klaus Leipold, Unternehmensstrafrecht – 
Eine rechtspolitische Notwendigkeit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK, 34 (2013). 
5  For an overview on the key regulations and a first assessment see Björn Gercke & Andreas Grözinger, BMJV-
Entwurf zu Verbandssanktionene: Zuckerbrot und Peitsche, LEGAL TRIBUNE ONLINE (Sep. 5, 2019, 03:06 
PM), https://www.lto.de//recht/hintergruende/h/verbandssanktionengesetz-entwurf-bmjv-compliance-in-
terne-untersuchungen-trennung-strafverteidigung-gastkommentar/; Alexander Ignor, Privatisierung der 
Strafverfolgung, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG – Einspruch (Sep. 9, 2019, 02:25 PM), 
https://www.faz.net/-irf-9qzju. 
6  E.g., EUR 531 million were confiscated from Porsche, cf. Stefan Mayr, Mit der Geldbuße ist der Dieselskandal 
noch lange nicht abgeschlossen, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (May 7, 2019, 04:00 PM), https://www.sueddeut-
sche.de/wirtschaft/porsche-dieselskandal-strafe-1.4435894; EUR 995 million were confiscated from Volkswa-
gen, cf. report by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Volkswagen muss eine Milliarde Euro Bußgeld zahlen, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Jun. 13, 2018, 06:34 PM), https://www.faz.net/-i9d-9b6ss. 
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In addition, prosecutors will retain the ability to seek to confiscate value of the proceeds 
of the offense in addition to the monetary sanction.7 There is no limit on the amount of 
values that can be confiscated. 
 
C. Non-Monetary Sanctions 
 
The draft bill proposes a variety of non-monetary sanctions against companies that the 
exist-ing law does not contain:  
• The court may impose the duty to provide restitution to victims of the corporate 
criminal offense, § 12 draft bill. 
• The court may also order a company to implement an effective compliance man-
agement system. The draft bill does not explicitly foresee the installation of a 
monitor as is sometimes ordered settlements with the U.S. Department of Justice 
or U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.8 However, the court may order the 
company to prove the installation and effectiveness of its compliance system by 
a certification of competent authority, i.e. attorneys, auditors or business con-
sultants, § 13 draft bill. 
• The court can issue a warning with a monetary fine to be imposed only if another 
corporate criminal offense is committed within a certain period of time or if the 
company repeatedly or severely disregards the court’s order to compensate vic-
tims or to implement an effective compliance management system, § 10 draft bill. 
• Lastly, and only in extraordinarily severe cases, the court may order a company’s 
liquidation, § 14 draft bill. 
 
D. Naming and Shaming 
 
Under existing law, corporate sanctions are generally not publicly disclosed. § 15 of the 
draft bill proposes that, in cases where there are a large number of aggrieved parties, the 
court may publicly disclose the sanctions imposed on a company. 
Generally, the draft imposes a non-public sanction register to be set up by the Federal 
Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (pursuant to §§ 55 et seqq. of the draft bill, 







7  Under existing law, this is possible pursuant to § 30 (3) in conjunction with § 17 (4) OWiG; see Klaus Rogall, 
in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, § 30, marginal no. 140 et seqq. (Wolfgang Mitsch, 5th ed., 2018); Carsten 
Krumm, Gewinnabschöpfung durch Geldbuße, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 196 (2011). 
8  See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The new corporate monitor: the new corporate czar?, 
105 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 1713 (2007). 
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E. Concluding Investigations without Criminal Charges 
 
The draft bill also provides for several possibilities for the public prosecution to terminate 
preliminary proceedings without charging the company: 
• First, while the draft bill mandates investigation, a prosecutor could terminate 
preliminary proceedings where the offense does not warrant criminal charges, § 
36 draft bill.  
• Second, the public prosecution would also be able to terminate preliminary pro-
ceedings and impose, with consent of the court, the duty to compensate victims 
or set-up an effective compliance system, § 37 in conjunction with §§ 12, 13 draft 
bill.  
• Third, the public prosecution may terminate preliminary proceedings in case of 
anti-trust corporate criminal offenses (due to specific jurisdiction of the Federal 
Cartel Office) pursuant to § 43 draft bill, in case of the company’s insolvency (§ 
40 draft bill) and if the company is expected to be held liable for the offense in 
foreign countries (§ 39 draft bill). The latter is the case if the sanction that could 
be imposed by the German public prosecution was relatively low compared to 
the sanction expected to be imposed by the foreign state, or if the foreign sanc-
tion is expected to have a sufficient influence on the company’s measures to pre-
vent future corporate criminal offenses. 
• Lastly, the public prosecution could temporarily suspend the preliminary pro-
ceedings pursuant to § 42 draft bill, and await the results of the company’s inde-
pendent internal investigation, if the company notifies the prosecution about its 
own ongoing internal investigation. 
All these possibilities are not included in the existing law. 
 
F. Mitigating Effect of Compliance Management Systems and Internal Investiga-
tions 
 
The draft bill stipulates in § 18 that establishing compliance management systems and con-
ducting internal investigations can be taken into account for sentencing purposes. This is 
in-tended to create an incentive to set up such compliance management systems or to con-
duct internal investigations which aid in detecting and remedying misconduct.9 As a con-
sequence, the court may reduce the sentence by up to half the upper limit of the monetary 
fines (§ 19 draft bill). 
 
§ 19 draft bill, while outlining ways in which the prosecution might resolve a case without 
charges, does not provide guidance as to how the company might seek to achieve a rea-
sonable settlement. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection has not taken the opportunity to introduce Non-Prosecution 
	
		
9 Explanatory memorandum for the draft bill, p. 99. 
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Agreements (“NPAs”) or Deferred-Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) into the law. This 
could have created a regulated procedure to negotiate the benefits of cooperation between 
the prosecutors and the company. The draft bill would also have benefited from provi-
sions guiding the exercise of discretion by the prosecution when determining sanctions. 
The UK approach to DPAs in combination with the sector-specific Sentencing Guide-
lines could have served as a model.10 In the United Kingdom, law enforcement agencies 
can only negotiate DPAs with companies, not with individuals.11 As a rule, the agreed 
conditions relate to fines, recompense obligations, the absorption of profits, if any, and a 
tightening of the company's internal compliance management system. The prerequisites 
for the conclusion of DPAs are set out in Schedule 17 to Section 45 of the Crime and 
Courts Act (2013). In addition, a Code of Practice ("CoP") was established for the purpose 
of uniform application of the law.12 
 
If the law enforcement authorities and a company agree on a DPA for the time being, its 
draft will be discussed in a public hearing, i.e. in court. The DPA must be approved by 
the negotiating court. The DPA will then also be published.13 
 
As the UK Bribery Act includes the offense of failure to prevent bribery, there is a partic-
ularly wide scope for DPAs. DPAs provide companies and prosecutors with an oppor-
tunity to resolve cases where there remain certain disputes – e.g., whether the compliance 
management system already provided for "adequate procedures" to prevent bribery. This, 
generally mutual uncertainty whether an existing compliance management system will be 
qualified as having already provided for "adequate procedures", offers considerable scope 
for the conclusion of DPAs.14 
 
However, internal investigations only mitigate sanctions if they have been carried out suc-
cess-fully and lawfully, and in full cooperation with the public prosecution. 
• To be considered successful, the internal investigation must have made a signifi-
cant contribution to solving the offense.  
• To be considered lawful, the investigation must be conducted in accordance with 
the applicable law. This might particularly refer to data protection and labor law 
provisions, and the basic principle of fair trial (§ 18 (1) (6) draft bill). When con-
ducting internal investigations, employees need to be notified on the possibility 
	
		
10  Schorn/Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements nach neuem britischen Recht - Perspektiven für un-
ternehmensinterne Compliance und Investigations, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 211 ff.; (2014) 
CINDY ALEXANDER & MARK COHEN, TRENDS IN THE USE OF NON-PROSECUTION, DEFERRED PROSECU-
TION, AND PLEA AGREEMENTS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ALLEGED CORPORATE CRIMINAL WRONGDOING 
(April 2015). 
11  See Part. 1, Schedule 17 zu § 45 Crime and Courts Act (2013). 
12  (Sep. 5, 2019, 03:17 PM) https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/dpa_cop.pdf. 
13  DPAs are published on the Serious Fraud Office website, (Sep. 5, 2019, 03:16 PM) 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecution-agreements/. 
14  CARSTEN MOMSEN, CORINNA HELMS & SARAH WASHINGTON, WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAF-
RECHT (2nd ed.) 2019. 
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that their statements could be used in criminal proceedings, on their right to be 
accompanied to interviews by an attorney (or a member of the workers’ council), 
and on their right to remain silent, i.e. not to self-incriminate. Special attention 
should also be paid to the requirements of the EU General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR15). Providing kind of a 
general allowance, Section 35 of the draft states the use of personal data from in-
vestigative measures within investigative procedure and court trial.16 Whether 
this general rule can suspend the restrictions of the GDPR appears to be doubt-
ful. 
• To be considered in full cooperation with public prosecution, the company must 
make the results of the internal investigation as well as all relevant documents 
available to the public prosecution. 
Furthermore, the draft bill includes rules about how investigations should be conducted 
and by whom. To be considered in full cooperation, internal investigations must be con-
ducted by an attorney that is different from the company’s defense attorney in order for 
the company to profit from the mitigating effect. It seems that the authors of the draft 
bill believe that full cooperation is only possible where the attorney conducting the inves-
tigation is independent of the company’s defense to any criminal charges.17 
 
Furthermore the draft does not address whistleblower protection. This omission may 
turn out as a crucial deficit. Since the provisions on witness protection in the Criminal 
Procedure Code do not fit whistleblowers and a Ruling like RICO (Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations Act) is very much alien to German law, a provision is urgently 
needed. At present, however, it is not even clear whether a protection concept is intended 





15  On the impact of the GDPR on internal investigations see Lukas Ströbel, Wolf-Tassilo Böhm & Christina 
Breunig & Tim Wybitul, Beschäftigtendatenschutz und Compliance: Compliance-Kontrollen und interne Er-
mittlungen nach der EU-Datenschutz-Grundverordnung und dem neuen Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, CORPO-
RATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 14 (2018); Dorothee Herrmann & Finn Zeidler, Arbeitnehmer und interne 
Untersuchungen – ein Balanceakt, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT, 1499 (2017). 
16  According to § 18 (1) draft bill personal data obtained as a result of measures taken to clarify the offence com-
mitted by the Association or an administrative offence connected with the offence committed by the Associa-
tion pursuant to Section 130 of the Act on Administrative Offences may be used in sanction proceedings. 
Whereas § 18 (2) draft bill clarifies Personal data being obtained as a result of measures to investigate other 
criminal offences or under other laws may be used in sanction proceedings if, under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, they may also be used in proceedings relating to the offence committed by the Association. It is 
unclear if this can be seen as consent under GDPR as well concerning delivering the data to e.g. US agencies or 
the company´s headquarter if located outside Germany. If not, the Company bears a significant risk, since the 
fines under GDPR are similarly high as the maximum amounts that can be imposed with the criminal sanc-
tions, cf. Thomas Grützner & Carsten Momsen, Gesetzliche Regelung unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen 
– Gewinn an Rechtsstaatlichkeit oder unnötige Komplikation?, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 242 
ff. (2017). 
17  Nevertheless, it deems possible that both attorneys work for the same law firm. Talking about minimizing 
conflicts of interests this is surprising. 
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G. Company’s Rights and Legal Privilege 
 
Pursuant to the draft, companies would be given the same legal protections as accused 
persons (§ 28 draft bill). This would include the right on fair hearing, the right on motions 
in the proceedings, the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent for the com-
pany’s legal representatives.18 
 
Furthermore, the principles of legal privilege apply. However, in Germany legal privilege 
does not exist in in the same way as in Common Law countries, but only in a few cases 
regulated expressly by criminal procedural law. 19While all attorneys have the right to re-
fuse testimony concerning information that was entrusted to them or became known to 
them in this capacity pursuant to § 53 (1) sentence 1 no. 3 StPO (Strafprozessordnung - Ger-
man Code of Criminal Procedure)20, documents or data containing such information 
might be subject to seizure, especially if they are not part of the company’s defense. 
 
As stated above, the draft bill stipulates that the company’s defense attorney and the at-
torney conducting an internal investigation must not be identical. While for the defense 
attorney, all attorney-client communication and all attorney work products would be 
subject to the prohibition of seizure, communication with and work products from the 
attorney conducting the internal investigation are privileged only under the following 
limited circumstances21: 
• Preliminary proceedings have already been initiated by the public prosecution. 
• Documents or data need to be subject to a special relationship of trust between 
the company and its attorney, which requires the company itself (and not, e.g., 
its mother company) to mandate the attorney to conduct the internal investiga-
tion. The draft bill does not provide in detail which kind of documents or data 
are subject to this relationship of trust. 
• Documents or data need to be in the possession of the attorney. An investigation 
report or attorney-client communication referring to the internal investigation 
could always be seized in the company’s premises. 
The draft bill’s explanatory memorandum explicitly excludes internal investigations from 
the application of legal privilege and the prohibition of seizure, if the investigation is con-
ducted solely for internal compliance reasons and does not relate to any potential offence 
	
		
18  Cf. explanatory memorandum for the draft bill, p. 110 et seq. 
19  Markus S. Rieder & Jonas Menne, Internal Investigations – Legal Situation, Possible Options And Legal-
Political Need For Action, 5 COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 20, 29 (2019); Thomas Grützner & Alexan-
der Jakob, in: Compliance von A-Z, Anwaltsprivileg (Allgemein) (Thomas Grützner & Alexander Jakob, 2nd. 
ed., 2015). 
20  Cf. Markus Bader, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 53, marginal no. 16 (Rolf Hannich, 
8th ed., 2019); Percic, in: Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, § 53, marginal no. 20 (Christoph Knauer et al eds., 
1st ed., 2014). 
21  Cf. Explanatory memorandum for the draft bill, p. 137. 
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punishable under the Corporate Sanctions Act.22 In addition, business documents that a 
company is legally required to retain are exempted from the prohibition of seizure, since 
an attorney shall not—intentionally or unintentionally—act as a “safe harbor” for such 
documents.23 
 
It is disappointing that the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection decided 
against a broader protection of legal privilege, which can have adverse effects on how in-
vestigations are conducted in Germany and particularly for cross-border investigations 
subject to different legal regimes and privilege protections. The draft bill follows the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court’s 2018 decisions on complaints against the search of a law firm 
and the securing of documents and data in the firm’s premises. The Court’s decisions had 
declared those measures to be in accordance with the constitution and therefore severely 
limited legal privilege in Germany. The Court and the Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection both justify the limitation of legal privilege with the “effectiveness 
of criminal prosecution”. However, the effectiveness of the criminal prosecution is com-
plemented and contrasted by the constitutional requirement for an effective and orderly 
administration of justice and the requirement of a fair trial. Both require a corresponding 
protection of legal privilege. Moreover, the allegation that a comprehensive legal privilege 
would lead to numerous lawyers being used as a “safe harbor” for certain documents or 
even incriminating evidence is shortsighted and completely disregards the serious profes-
sional and criminal consequences of such conduct.24 
 
A broader legal privilege that properly protects the attorney-client-relationship between 
a company and its lawyers would have been preferable. In particular, it is not comprehen-
sible why the draft bill rigorously differentiates between defense counsel and other law-
yers con-ducting internal investigations, as the whole process of conducting internal in-
vestigations should serve to detect and remedy misconduct, in ways that are not incon-
sistent with the company’s potential defense. It also remains unclear why legal privilege 
should only apply if preliminary proceedings have already been initiated by the public 
prosecution. Such an arbitrary lean creates a disincentive for companies to proactively in-
itiate internal investigations to detect and remedy misconduct, but subjecting them to 
privilege only if the government has already started investigating.  
 
In an inquisitorial system, it is solely the prosecution’s responsibility to investigate and 
collect evidence. It is under current law not the business of the defense. The draft bill tries 
to out-source internal investigations according to adversarial systems, but lacks adequate 
	
		
22  Explanatory memorandum for the draft bill, p. 137. 
23  Critical on the regulations on internal investigations Stefan Kirsch, Entwurf zum Unternehmensstrafrecht: 
Affront für Verteidiger, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG – Einspruch (August 16, 2019, 01:05 PM), 
https://www.faz.net/einspruch/entwurf-zum-unternehmensstrafrecht-affront-fuer-verteidiger-
16352605.html. 
24  Markus S. Rieder & Jonas Menne, Internal Investigations – Legal Situation, Possible Options And Legal-Polit-
ical Need For Action, 5 COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 20, 37 et seq. (2019). 
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adjustments of legal privilege. The public prosecutor's office is given more extensive dis-
cretionary powers and approaches for investigative measures. On the other hand, the de-
fense is still not granted its own investigative rights or provided with appropriate instru-
ments. The latter must be made up for with increasing urgency in order to restore at least 
some equality of the arms in the investigation procedure. 
 
H. Offenses Committed in Foreign Countries and by Foreign Companies’ Employ-
ees 
 
The legal consequences of offenses committed abroad and the sanction of foreign com-
panies proposed by the draft bill would depend on whether the act for which the com-
pany is held liable is governed by German criminal law or not. German criminal law con-
tains various constellations of extraterritorial application such as offenses involving Ger-
man citizens or infringing domestic legal interests (cf. §§ 3 et seqq. StGB (Strafgesetzbuch 
– German Criminal Code)).25 
 
If German criminal law applies to the act, foreign companies could be sanctioned if their 
legal typology was comparable to a German legal entity or partnership. German compa-
nies could be held liable without further requirements.26 This is equivalent to the legal 
situation under existing law. However, the enforcement of an imposed fine against a for-
eign company could be an obstacle, if the concerned company does not have a seat or 
assets in Germany.27 
 
Under existing law, no sanctions can be imposed if German criminal law does not apply 
to the act.28 The Corporate Sanctions Act would, pursuant to § 2 (2), apply to such an act, 
if it were a criminal offense under German criminal law, if it is a criminal offense at the 
place of the offense and if the company has a seat in Germany. This applies to both Ger-
man and foreign companies. The draft bill does not provide for any restrictions as for the 
place of the offense or the nationalities of either offender or victim. However, as stated 
above, investigation proceedings could be terminated without bringing charges against 





25  For an overview, see Jürgen Rath, Internationales Strafrecht (§§ 3 ff. StGB), JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLÄTTER, 
26 (2007). 
26  Markus Rübenstahl, Frank Saliger & Michael Tsambikakis, in: Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, § 30 OWiG, marginal 
no. 19 (Robert Esser et al eds., 1st ed., 2017). 
27  Cf. Lars Niesler, in: Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, § 30 OWiG, marginal no. 8 (Jürgen Graf et al eds., 2nd 
ed., 2017). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the draft provides prosecutors with effective tools to prosecute corporate crime. 
Deficits appear mainly due to the mixing of the historically inquisitorial German system 
with the reality of a partially adversarial procedure in white-collar crime. Areas that should 
be revisited before the draft bill becomes law include:  
• Considering regulated instruments such as NPAs and DPAs into German law.  
• Providing guidance for how sanctions will be determined, either on the model of 
the English Sentencing Guidelines or with a set of instruments comparable to the 
DOJ Principles. 
• Not limiting the maximum mitigation to 50 percent, as extraordinary coopera-
tion may justify a greater reduction in sentencing. 
• Conceptualizing whistleblower protection 
• Finally, a broader legal privilege would be desirable to properly protect the attor-
ney-client relationship during internal investigations, appropriately recognize 
the position of lawyers as independent organ of the administration of justice, and 
better align with other major enforcement authorities in the U.S. and U.K. 
